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INTRODUCTION 
All housing finance systems across the globe are 
aimed at delivering funds to the producers and 
purchasers of housing. Housing finance structures 
are therefore created with the aim of making 
funds available to borrowers. This basic  aim has  
brought  about a profusely wide spectrum  of  
institutional  arrangements  ranging from  con-
tractual  savings  scheme to  depository  institu-
tions  specializing in  mortgage  finance,  to the 
issuance, sale, trading and transfer of mortgage 
securities to third parties. All these arrangements 
have been created with the same purpose in mind, 
that is to channel funds from savers to borrowers 
(Lea, 2000). As economies develop, the provision 
of housing finance often moves away from the 
extensive reliance on special circuits towards the 
integration of housing finance into the broader 
financial markets (Diamond and Lea, 1992b). 
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The formal housing finance system in Ghana is inadequate and highly underdeveloped. The formal 
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problems in the country through the use of Secondary Mortgage Market (SMM). It does so by sur-
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SMM. It notes that the scale of mortgage origination in the primary market is limited; the adjudica-
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plementing a secondary mortgage market in the country. 
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In the traditional system of formal housing fi-
nance, an institution mobilises savings from de-
positors and then grant loans to borrowers. Under 
this system, a lender originates, services, and 
funds the loan; and manages the portfolio risk. 
However, under a secondary mortgage market 
regime, mortgages are originated by one agent 
and are then transferred to capital market inves-
tors who serve as the final holders. It therefore 
mobilises long term housing funds from capital 
market investors thus mitigating interest rate, 
liquidity and default risk. It removes the risks of 
holding mortgages from the mortgage originators 
and transfers same to capital market investors. 
The fast growing capital market of Ghana has 
provided an opportunity for sustainable housing 
finance. The major issue is whether Ghana is 
ready to exploit the huge potential of the capital 
market to overcome the low and poor housing 
consumption in the country. 
The housing finance systems in Ghana are inade-
quate and highly underdeveloped. The formal 
finance institutions have provided very little 
mortgages particularly to the low and middle-
income households. For instance, the total mort-
gages originated by the Home Finance Company 
(HFC, now HFC Bank) in 2001 was US$4.9 mil-
lion which constituted approximately 95% of all 
mortgages created in Ghana for 2001 (HFC, 
2005). In 2007 the formal finance institutions 
allocated 15.9% of their total credit to miscellane-
ous sectors which included mortgages (2008 
Budget Statement, Ghana). The inclusion of mort-
gages in the miscellaneous credit gives ample 
evidence of the little importance attached to mort-
gage finance by the financial institutions as an 
investment opportunity.  
It is argued that if a formal housing finance mar-
ket could be developed in Ghana, it will promote 
housing investment and development by provid-
ing sustainable housing funds to households in 
the country. Similarly, property finance through 
the formal finance market will free up capital that 
might be locked up in dwellings under develop-
ment which eventually becomes “dead capital”. 
Property owners will also be able to realize equity 
from their properties for investment in profitable 
ventures. Homeowners as well as the overall 
economy could be enriched, thereby complement-
ing government’s effort to reduce poverty (Asare 
and Whitehead, 2006). 
This paper explores the possibility of addressing 
the housing finance problem in Ghana through 
the Secondary Mortgage Market (SMM). This is 
done by surveying the literature on SMM. It also 
highlights on Ghana’s attempt at SMM in 1993. 
The paper relies much on secondary data from the 
literature and official sources such as the HFC, 
Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), and the Ministry 
of Works and Housing (MWH). Information was 
gathered through mail shots, telephone contacts 
and archival and official documentary surveys. 
The mortgage market is evaluated to determine 
whether the fundamentals are right to implement 
SMM in Ghana.  
 
Housing finance systems in Ghana 
There remains a clear segregation between the 
housing sector and the formal finance market in 
Ghana (Asare and Whitehead, 2006). Leod, 
(2001) noted that there is an increasing gap be-
tween poor people living in the informal sector 
and the formal finance sectors. As a result most 
households in Ghana use their own savings; sweat 
equity; barter arrangements; and remittances from 
family members abroad to build their houses. 
Debrah et al., (2002) noted that this process of 
housing development takes between five to fif-
teen years. Housing finance therefore remains in a 
primitive state compared to the rapid develop-
ment of banking (Jaffe and Renaud, 1996). Smet 
(1996) noted that this approach to housing provi-
sion is both expensive and ineffective. The exces-
sively long time required by most households to 
complete their greatly profusely increases con-
struction costs and also locks up funds that could 
be invested in income-generating ventures in 
properties for several years without any returns.  
In all economies long-term housing loans creates 
significant credit, interest rate and liquidity risks 
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for lenders (Jaffe and Renaud, 1996). In Ghana, 
high inflation rates1 have expanded this risk fur-
ther. Most banks are therefore unable to invest in 
the long and medium term, which have had nega-
tive impact on housing investment. Financial in-
stitutions such as the Social Security Bank (now 
SG-SSB) and First Ghana Building Society 
(FGBS) all aimed at developing formal debt fi-
nance systems for housing development in Ghana 
but did not succeed partly because of the absence 
of long-term sources of funds and economic in-
stability which are essential ingredients for a well 
functioning mortgage market.  
 In some cases lenders have been ostensibly will-
ing to offer long term housing finance, “but in 
order to survive, the banks must make a profit, to 
thrive, the return must warrant the investment of 
capital and to grow the bank must accumulate 
retained earnings to support asset 
growth” (Karley, 2002). Lenders, therefore result 
to stringent underwriting criteria, such as a higher 
equity requirement of borrowers, security of title 
to land, a sustained and reliable monthly income, 
consent of borrowers’ employers, and the location 
of properties in prime areas as a means of mini-
mizing risk and mitigating losses. The security 
requirement of lenders has made it impossible for 
most potential mortgagors to qualify for mort-
gages in Ghana. The conventional bank lending, 
based on asset securities assumes that collateral 
should be restricted to legally restricted property 
and certifiable earnings (Karley, 2002). This con-
ception of capital assets immediately excludes the 
vast majority of those living in the informal set-
tlements and depended on livelihood generated 
within the Ghanaian informal economy. Alterna-
tive asset bases that may offer far greater security 
in the long term are not understood or recognized 
as effective indicators or predictors of “safe” 
lending. The requirements for evidence of clear 
land title have excluded many potential mortga-
gors in Ghana despite the fact that they may have 
effective security of tenure through customary 
rights.  
Government involvement in housing finance has 
been done through direct construction and subsi-
dised loans provision. For instance between 1957 
and 1966 the government invested £G 9,100,0002 
in affordable housing and also granted £G 
2,150,000 as concessionary housing loans to 
households (Government of Ghana Development 
Plan 1959). Similarly in 2004 and 2005 the gov-
ernment of Ghana respectively invested ¢
77,728.24 and ¢125,513.4 (in millions) in the 
housing sector (Ghana Statistical Service, 2007). 
However, all these efforts by government have 
proved largely inadequate in providing sustain-
able housing funds for the bulk of Ghanaians and 
have been unable to solve the housing problem of 
the country. For instance, Ghana had a housing 
deficit of approximately 1,000,000 units in 2000 
(Ghana Statistical Service 2002). It was also esti-
mated by the HFC (Now HFC Bank) in 2002, that 
the country had an estimated unsatisfied housing 
need of 1,232,835 units, with an estimated unsat-
isfied annual demand of 108,000 units. The in-
vestments by the government have made little 
impact in solving the housing finance problem in 
the country.  
 
Mortgage securitization and housing finance 
In traditional intermediation, all the functions 
related to mortgage lending are integrated: the 
originator of a portfolio of loans holds, services 
and funds them until maturity, thereby bearing all 
the risks associated with them (Amelia, 2001).  
However, an SMM system operates a dual hous-
ing finance market: a primary market where mort-
gages are originated and a secondary mortgage 
market (SMM) where the originated mortgages 
are sold. Securitization enables mortgages to be 
originated by one institution (e.g. banks and 
building societies) and then sold to final investor 
who hold them. It is a mechanism where bundles 
of mortgages are pooled together and then sold to 
capital market investors. Whitehead and Karley 
(2002) noted that securitization is a device of 
structured financing where an entity seeks to pool 
together its interest in identifiable cash flows over 
time, transfer the same to investors either with or 
without the support of further collateral, and 
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thereby achieve the purpose of financing. The 
right to receive cash flow from a mortgage con-
tract can be sold to a third party, which is the ba-
sis for securitization. Investors in the mortgage 
backed securities provide the funding for the 
loans and bear default risk, which is generally 
mitigated by the use of different mechanisms of 
credit and liquidity enhancement (Amelia, 2001). 
Mortgage securitization involves the sale of mort-
gage loans (or loan portfolios) or mortgage secu-
rities backed by specific pool of mortgages. It 
securitizes the originated mortgages and sells 
them to long term investors (Sa-Aadu, 1997). As 
such, it involves the transfer of risk and owner-
ship of mortgage loans to a third party; the secu-
rity holder assumes default risk and the lender 
then expunges the loan amount from its balance 
sheet. Securitization allocates the risk in mort-
gage instruments to those better able to handle 
them (Sa-Aadu, 1997). The loans may be sold to 
specialized institutions called conduits or through 
specialized purpose vehicles. These entities raise 
funds through the issuance of securities collateral-
ized by the principal and interest payments on the 
loans. It separates the three functions of financial 
intermediation: origination, servicing and holding 
and allows each to be handled by the most effi-
cient provider. This lowers the intermediation 
costs of institutions that choose to specialise in 
originating and servicing of mortgages. Mortgage 
securitisation leads to the specialisation of the 
mortgage industry which also improves competi-
tion in the mortgage market (Amelia, 2001). In-
creased competition reduces the cost of credit to 
consumers and market prices govern the alloca-
tion of funds” (Lea 1994). Securitization there-
fore provides a wide array of benefits for lenders, 
borrowers and investors and has a substantial 
social and economic impact. 
Hendershott and Shilling (1989) showed that the 
expansion of securitisation leads to a reduction in 
mortgage rates (mortgage cost). The cost of mort-
gages will be reduced as a result of improvement 
in the marketability of mortgage backed securities 
(MBS) (Black et al., 1981). The decline in mort-
gage credit cost as a result of securitization will
make it possible for most households to qualify 
and afford home mortgages. Sellon and Van Nah-
men (1988) argued that the development of mort-
gage pass-through securities will improve the 
efficiency of housing finance thereby increasing 
the liquidity of the mortgage market. Lenders 
achieve greater liquidity by holding a mortgage-
backed security instead of the mortgage itself 
(Heuson et al., 2001). Liquidity will reduce li-
quidity risk, facilitate participation in the mort-
gage market and increase lending activities, by 
providing lenders access to the capital market and 
expanded funding opportunities. SMM will re-
duce interest rate risk by matching long-term 
mortgages with long-term sources of funds. Pol-
lock (1994) noted that SMM provides institu-
tional investors with attractive trade-offs between 
profitability, liquidity, simplicity and security. A 
well functioning mortgage market will provide 
enormous external benefit to the economy includ-
ing capital market development, increased labour 
market mobility, construction sector employment, 
and the efficient allocation of real estate asset 
(Jaffe and Renaud, 1996).  
Hendershott (1990) and Hendershott and Van 
Order (1989) noted that mortgage securitisation 
improves the integration between the mortgage 
and capital markets, which in turn soften housing 
market cycles. Gabriel (1987) also noted that se-
curitisation will improve the integration between 
the mortgage and capital markets. Integration will 
increase the availability of housing funds. Secu-
ritisation will therefore help to alleviate the ef-
fects of capital shortages and financing con-
straints on the housing sector. Roth (1988) reports 
a faster adjustment of mortgage rates to changes 
in money market rates and an increase in the 
volatility of mortgage rates since the use of secu-
ritisation. Ryding (1990) argued that mortgage 
securitisation reduces the spread between mort-
gage and other money market interest rates. The 
reduction in the spread makes mortgages very 
competitive with other investment opportunities 
in the economy which helps to attract sustainable 
funds to the housing sector. 
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Mortgage securities market now exists in over 25 
countries across the globe and these include 
United Kingdom, Australia, Italy, Germany, 
Spain, Netherlands, Ireland and Finland. The out-
standing success of mortgage securitization in the 
United States (US) has encouraged many coun-
tries that are seeking for a sustainable means of 
housing finance to replicate their experience. In 
the United States, more than 53% of all mort-
gages have been securitised and over 70% of new 
mortgage originations are sold in the secondary 
market each year (Whitehead and Karley, 2002). 
In 1993 securitisation was used to fund 93% of 
the total residential mortgage origination in the 
US (Kolari et al., 1998). The yearly agency secu-
ritisation rate in the US fluctuated between 45% 
and 78% of conforming mortgages origination 
during the 1990’s (Passmore et al., 2001). The 
secondary mortgage market is the dominant 
source of housing funds in the US. The out-
standing amount of US Agency mortgage-backed 
securities was $2,292 billion and $4,604.2 billion 
by the end of 1999 and 2007 respectively 
(Securities Industry and Financial Markets Asso-
ciation, 2008). Important initiatives, both legal 
and policy based, that are aimed at increasing 
securitisation have been embarked on in many 
European countries. By the end of 2006, the out-
standing European commercial mortgage-backed 
securities stood at €118.4 billion (Securities In-
dustry and Financial Markets Association, 2008). 
 
Requirements for securitization  
There are prerequisites for a successful mortgage 
market. These include a stable macro-economic 
environment (a low inflation and interest rates as 
well as a stable currency) and liquidity. These 
factors are very crucial for the attainment of a 
vibrant mortgage market (Gyamfi-Yeboah and 
Boamah, 2003). Illiquidity means increased inter-
est rate risk for mortgagees since they have short 
term liabilities relative to their mortgage assets. A 
well organised primary market, reliable legal and 
regulatory framework and a vibrant capital mar-
ket are also extremely important for the success 
of SMM. Lenders are highly interested in the 
quality and security of the property to be used as 
collateral (Boamah, 2003). They are also mostly 
concerned about the enforceability of the collat-
eral in the face of default. This calls for an effi-
cient land title regime and an expeditious foreclo-
sure procedures.  
Similarly mortgages must be attractive invest-
ments with market driven interest rates that pro-
vide investors with a positive, real risk-adjusted 
rate of return. The primary market base must be 
large to justify the costs of setting up the secon-
dary market (Whitehead and Karley, 2002). The 
mortgage instrument and documentation should 
be standardized, underwriting must be compre-
hensive and consistent, and servicing must be 
efficient (Jaffe and Renaud, 1996; Sa-Aadu, 
1997; Boamah, 2003). For underwriting to be an 
effective system for pricing risk, some form of 
standardization in mortgage instruments is neces-
sary. Too much diversity in mortgage instruments 
makes mortgages more illiquid. The more devel-
oped the government bond market, the greater the 
likelihood of success in developing a mortgage 
securities market. It will provide a benchmark 
yield to compare yields on other instruments 
against; market makers; regulatory body to over-
see security issues; and rating agencies. 
 
Mortgage securitization in Ghana 
Ghana attempted a Secondary Mortgage Market 
in 1993 in its quest to create a sustainable housing 
finance regime in the country. It was created with 
the passage of the Home Mortgage Finance Law 
(PNDCL 329) 1993, which established and en-
joined the Home Finance Company (HFC) to 
provide mortgage finance to individuals and to 
provide liquidity to participating financial institu-
tions under the law. The HFC was thus a primary 
participant and also a liquidator. The banking 
institutions, which were then going through a 
process of restructuring and recapitalization, were 
expected to operate a primary mortgage market to 
complete the two-tier mortgage financing system 
in Ghana. The restructured financial institutions 
were expected to bear only 10% default risk 
thereby insulating them from significant risk. The 
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Government of Ghana was to bear the remaining 
90% default risk. HFC was thus to bear no default 
risk. 
Unfortunately, the system did not succeed as the 
financial institutions failed to assume their new 
role of operating a primary mortgage market. To 
ensure its survival, the HFC assumed the role of a 
primary mortgage lender. It therefore emerged as 
the dominant primary mortgagee instead of being 
a mortgage liquidator. That is, the purpose of 
establishing a liquidating institution was attained 
but that of operating a secondary mortgage mar-
ket was not achieved. Interestingly, the HFC has 
now joined the commercial banking industry with 
mortgage lending becoming part of the com-
pany’s overall investment portfolio. This of itself 
changed the nature of the initiative and raised the 
possibility of more general banking activities 
diverting the company from its prime objective of 
providing finance for housing (Asare, 2004). The 
failure of Ghana’s 1993 attempt at SMM may be 
attributed to high inflation rates, high interest 
rates, inadequate mortgage originations in the 
primary market, inadequate regulatory frame-
work, slow adjudication procedures, poor land 
titling system and inadequate collateralization. 
These issues are discussed further in the next sec-
tion. 
 
Why a secondary mortgage market in Ghana? 
An SMM is necessary for solving the housing 
finance problem of Ghana, since it enables lend-
ers to shed the risk associated with the holding of 
mortgage loans. It will also create standards for 
credit evaluation and collateral procedures that 
will directly increase the efficiency of the primary 
market.  Many of the benefits of standardization 
are due to appropriate documentation and risk 
assessment procedures rather than from the range 
of products available (Whitehead and Karley, 
2002). Greater standardization will reduce trans-
action costs in Ghana and make mortgage securi-
ties more easily accepted by credit rating agencies 
and investors alike. Securitization will generate 
funds at a relatively stable cost. This can make it 
a useful way of providing marginal funds – as it 
can be done without increasing overall average 
costs. It is cheaper to raise funds via mortgage 
backed securities (MBS) than with a deposit sys-
tem (Sa-Aadu, 1997). Donahoo and Shaffer 
(1991) and Pennacchi (1988) noted that asset se-
curitization reduces the financing costs of lenders. 
It is appropriate if primary market lenders have a 
poor access to the broader capital markets or con-
cerns exist about their ability to manage interest 
rate or liquidity risk as is the case in Ghana.  
A properly structured secondary market will lead 
to an increased funding for housing, lower mort-
gage credit cost for both participants and lenders, 
reduce transaction costs, and provide liquidity for 
primary market lenders in Ghana. Two of the 
main features of securitisation are that it increases 
liquidity (and therefore the investor base) and 
redistributes the risks associated with the secu-
ritised loans (Sa-Aadu (1997). The consequence 
of this would be a lower mortgage cost for Gha-
naian borrowers than in the traditional interme-
diation case. By expanding the pool of funding 
options available there will be less pressure on 
government to provide direct (and often subsi-
dized) credit to households seeking to acquire 
their own housing units. It will also allow for 
greater diversification and thus reduce mortgage 
lending (liquidity, interest rate, default) risk in 
Ghana. 
There is high liquidity risk in the Ghanaian mort-
gage market; mortgages have long-term maturi-
ties (about 30 years) and there are also no markets 
to trade them in. Mortgage lenders in Ghana are 
therefore unable to rapidly convert their mortgage 
assets to cash. However, depositors mostly prefer 
to convert deposits to cash to meet their respec-
tive demand for funds. This potentially large and 
unexpected deposit outflows, requires that asset 
be rapidly sold to finance the deposit outflows 
(Jaffe and Renaud, 1996). Mortgages thus create 
significant liquidity risk to lenders in Ghana. The 
Ghanaian mortgage market is therefore unattrac-
tive to lenders since Government securities are 
good assets for this purpose (they trade in active 
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and liquid markets) whilst business and personal 
loans are self-liquidating due to their short-term 
maturities. A secondary mortgage market will 
help to address the liquidity problem that mort-
gage lenders in Ghana face. Improved liquidity is 
a key effect of mortgage securitization (Jones, 
1962). 
Interest rate risk a decrease in the market value of 
a mortgage loan as a result of an unanticipated 
rise in interest rates is very substantial in Ghana. 
It occurs as a result of the imbalance between the 
maturity of assets and liabilities of lenders. The 
cost of their liabilities may increase relative to the 
returns on their mortgage assets. If interest rates 
suddenly rise, lenders who have huge outstanding 
fixed interest rate mortgages may face serious 
difficulty as interest cost on savings rises relative 
to interest revenue from mortgages. The interest 
rate risk is accentuated by the long term nature of 
mortgages. Interest rate in Ghana has been on the 
ascendancy and unstable since 1990. It increased 
from, 29.20% to 39% from 1991 to 1992, 37.50% 
to 47.50% from 1994 to 1995, 40.50 to 51.58% 
from 1999 to 2000, and subsequently rose to 55% 
in 2001. Most borrowers are unable to service 
loans at such high interest rate thereby expanding 
the default risk of lenders. The interest rate risk 
increases the likelihood of borrowers’ default 
(Jaffe and Renaud, 1996). However, an SMM will 
enable mortgagees in Ghana to shed this risk by 
transferring it to long term investors. 
Securitization is necessary in achieving a long-
term sustainable housing finance in Ghana since 
it will address some of the risks- interest rate, 
liquidity and default that Ghanaian mortgage 
lenders face. A secondary market facility allows 
mortgage lenders to manage their liquidity and 
interest rate risks and acts as a potent force for the 
diffusion of mortgage lending among a variety of 
institutions (Sa-Aadu, 1997). Hess and Smith 
(1988) noted that asset securitization is a means 
of reducing risk through diversification. Boot and 
Thakor (1993) demonstrate that diversification 
may improve access to information. The diversifi-
cation leads to efficient mortgage markets and 
eliminates asset idiosyncrasies. It will lead to a 
vibrant mortgage market in Ghana and ensure a 
sustainable flow of funds to the housing sector 
thus making it possible for many Ghanaians par-
ticularly the middle income households to be able 
to afford their own homes. Mortgage securitiza-
tion will provide the needed funds for housing 
investment in Ghana and also offer enormous 
benefit to the Ghanaian economy. There are how-
ever some issues to be addressed if it is to suc-
ceed in the country. 
First the volumes of mortgages originated in the 
primary market are crucial for the success of 
mortgage securitization. Whitehead and Karley 
(2002) noted that securitization benefit could best 
be realized when there are economies of scale. 
Securitization is expensive when the scale of 
originated mortgages is low. The total out-
standing mortgages of the HFC in 1997, 2000 and 
2001 were respectively $19.7, $39.3 and $44.2 (in 
millions); these constituted about 95% of all out-
standing mortgages in Ghana (HFC, 2004).The 
volume of mortgages in Ghana is small for any 
effective securitization, and until the primary 
market provides adequate scale of mortgages to 
allow for economies of scale it would be expen-
sive to operate SMM and its benefits are unlikely 
to be realized in Ghana. 
Second, problems of collateralization and land 
titling must be adequately addressed. Without 
adequate collateral large scale mortgage origina-
tion in the primary market that is required for 
successful securitization will not be attained. Lea 
(2000) noted that “without collateral lenders are 
more reluctant to lend, housing loans are more 
expensive, and borrowers do not benefit from the 
fixed asset they own”. This can happen if clear 
title cannot be established or if the legal system 
does not allow for foreclosure or expeditious 
foreclosure as exists in Ghana. The Mortgages 
Decree 1972 (N.R.C.D 96) which deals with fore-
closure is outdated. Sections 15 and 18(9) of the 
N.R.C.D. 96 have abolished foreclosure as a rem-
edy to the mortgagee. Section 18 of the N.R.C.D. 
96 makes judicial sale of property on default the 
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only remedy available to the mortgagee. This 
process is slow, expensive and does not provide 
the mortgagee adequate collateral. Similarly, land 
title registration system is not very effective de-
spite the existence of the Land Title Registration 
Law (P.N.D.C.L 152) 1986. The whole process is 
very cumbersome, frustrating and does not en-
courage land owners to register their title. The 
inability of Ghanaians to use their houses as col-
lateral because of the lack of proper legal title is a 
major hindrance to the development of the pri-
mary mortgage market and hence mortgage secu-
ritization in the country. Ajanlekoko (2001) noted 
that most banks shy away from land development 
loans in Ghana and Nigeria due to unreliable title 
documents. Until the problem of collateralization 
is addressed mortgage securitization will be un-
successful in Ghana. 
Finally, the role of the government is germane for 
the success of SMM. The government should 
explicitly guarantee the mortgage backed securi-
ties issued. This will instil investor confidence in 
the securities and help attain the purpose of set-
ting up the SMM. Black et al. (1981) and Pass-
more and Sparks (1996) noted that the govern-
ment guarantee enhances liquidity. Implicit guar-
antees are inefficient since the government re-
mains obligated, but the issued securities do not 
benefit fully. The government should maintain an 
important supervisory role, reflecting its stake in 
the guarantees it provides on mortgages and the 
institutions operating in the SMM (Jaffe and 
Renaud, 1996). The P.N.D.C.L. 329, 1993 did not 
guarantee mortgagees created by all mortgage 
lenders in Ghana. Only the mortgages that were 
created by the participating financial institutions 
benefited from the state guarantee in the event of 
default. This did not create a level playing field 
for all mortgagees in Ghana. But the SMM and 
the associated state guarantee should be accessi-
ble by all lenders and borrowers who offer for 
sale mortgage instruments that conform to the 
underwriting standards.  This will ensure that 
only efficient institutions operate in the mortgage 
market. 
The development of a sound mortgage finance 
system cannot be achieved without a sound regu-
latory framework (Sa-Aadu, 1997). The regula-
tory framework should promote competition and 
free entry to the mortgage market by new lenders. 
Competition and efficiency should determine the 
participants of the mortgage market and not any 
form of institutional pre-selection. The purpose is 
to create an effective housing finance system and 
not to support any specific class of lenders or 
borrowers (Jaffe and Renaud, 1996). The Home 
Mortgage Finance Law (P.N.D.C.L. 329) 1993, 
that regulated the SMM in Ghana did not promote 
competition and free entry to the mortgage mar-
ket. Instead of allowing competition to determine 
market participants it pre-selected institutions 
such as the Barclays Bank of Ghana, Standard 
Chartered Bank (GH) Ltd, SSB Bank Ltd (now 
SG-SSB Bank), and the State Insurance Corpora-
tion as the participating financial institutions. 
This in essence restricted the market participants, 
prevented the entry of new lenders to the mort-
gage market and hindered the development of the 
primary mortgage market in Ghana. The regula-
tory framework must define capital adequacy; 
specify the type of mortgage assets purchased, 
asset classification, and mortgage securities is-
sued; state rules for diversification; and specify 
the accounting system, management, and mecha-
nism to control self-dealing by management. 
These requirements were not met by the 
P.N.D.C.L. 329, 1993. But this is essential if in-




An SMM in principle would enable Ghana to deal 
with some of the constraints on the mortgage 
market and attract housing funds. But in practice 
it is not the best way of solving the housing fi-
nance problem in the country since the fundamen-
tals are not right. The scale of mortgage origina-
tions in the country is extremely tiny for any ef-
fective securitization. SMM is not the best option 
at least until the problem of scale, land titling, and 
adjudication procedures are resolved. Securitiza-
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tion cannot solve the fundamental problems of 
poor legal framework, poor land titling system, 
inadequate collateralization, and inadequate 
household income that constrain the flow of funds 
and/or increase the cost of mortgages. However, 
these problems hinder the realization of a vibrant 
primary mortgage market and hence an efficient 
secondary mortgage market. Even though the 
capital markets in Ghana are fast growing, the 
scale of mortgage origination in the primary mar-
ket is limited; also the adjudication process is 
slow-foreclosure costs in terms of time and other 
resources are thus huge. It is appropriate for 
Ghana to concentrate on solving these basic prob-
lems before any attempt at implementing a secon-
dary mortgage market. Until the fundamental 
problems are solved securitization would not be 
the appropriate means of solving the housing fi-
nance problems in the country. At the moment it 
is unclear when Ghana may attempt to reintro-
duce SMM. However, it is expected that the full 
implementation of the Land Administration Pro-
ject (LAP) will ensure efficient land title registra-
tion system in Ghana. The macro-economic envi-
ronment has also improved over the years. What 
is needed now is a sound regulatory framework. 
When this is done then Ghana can implement 
SMM in the foreseeable future. 
 
ENDNOTES 
1. The inflation rates by the end of 1990, 1995, 
2000, 2007 and the first quarter of 2008 were 
respectively 39.5%, 70.8%, 18.4%, 12.7% 
and 13.2%. 
2. EG refers to Ghanaian pounds which was the 
then currency in use. 
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